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Abstract 
This paper empirically investigates the impact of public procurement regulation quality on competition 
and cost-effectiveness. I employ the World Bank’s Benchmarking Public Procurement quality scores. 
Using extensive data about public procurement in the European Economic Area, Switzerland, and 
Macedonia, the paper exhibits positive effects of improved regulation quality. Better quality scores are 
associated with higher levels of competition and cost-effectiveness. Improved regulation quality 
significantly increases number of bidders and the probability that procurement price is lower than 
estimated cost. 
Keywords 
Public Procurement; Regulation; Competition 
JEL codes: H57; O12 
 
  1 
1. Introduction 
Effective public procurement (PP) is integral for productive use of public resources and economic 
growth. World Bank (2012) emphasizes that “... poor governance of public procurement systems can 
turn public investments into major political and economic liabilities, hinder development goals and 
outcomes, and result in additional costs and waste public funds.” (Page 7) Accordingly, international 
organizations like the International Trade Centre UNCTAD/WTO (Wittig, 2002) and the OECD (2012) 
promote PP regulation. Wittig (2002) states that improved management of PP systems leads to benefits 
like enhanced competition, better administrative services and cost-effectiveness. Although 
policymakers and researchers (Campos et al., 2007 and Knack et al. 2017) promote improved PP 
regulation, empirical research about the effect of PP quality on PP outcomes is limited.  
In this paper, I examine the impact of PP quality on competition and cost-effectiveness. Tenders 
Electronic Daily (TED) data set of the European Union (EU) contains information about 5,303,219 PP 
contracts for the European Economic Area, Switzerland, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia for years 2006-2017. The cross-country structure of the TED data set allows identification 
of the effect of PP regulation quality. I employ the PP quality measures of the World Bank’s 
Benchmarking Public Procurement database (BPP). Specifically, I investigate the effect of four PP 
quality measures on the level of competition, selection of procurement method and cost-effectiveness 
in EU PP. These measures are bid preparation score, bid and contract management score, payment of 
suppliers score and PP overall index. Empirical analysis of the paper concludes that number of bidders 
are significantly higher when a country has higher PP quality scores. Countries with higher PP quality 
are more likely to implement competitive (open) procurement procedure. Finally, cost-effectiveness 
improves substantially as the PP quality of a country rises. Accordingly, this paper provides empirical 
evidence about the positive effect of improved PP regulations on PP outcomes.  
A closely related strand of literature investigates effect of public procurement practices on firm-level 
characteristics. Hoekman and Sanfilippo (2018) use a survey1 for 6,700 firms based in 19 Sub-Saharan 
African countries to investigate the effect of “the share of total sales to the Government” on firm 
performance. They find that higher government demand enhances firm performance. Djankov et al. 
(2017) shows that better PP regulation promotes quality of trade and transport infrastructure. They 
employ the Logistics Performance Index of the World Bank based on a survey of 1,000 logistics 
professionals in 143 countries to measure road quality. Knack et al. (2017) examine the survey answers 
of 33,385 firms from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys (WBES). They find that the probability that 
a firm participates in PP is higher in countries with more transparent procurement procedures. 
Additionally, percentage of kickbacks to officials are significantly lower in countries with better PP 
quality. Finally, Ghossein et al. (2018) combines BPP and WBES to examine PP quality on firm-level 
outcomes. They find that better PP quality is correlated with higher firm engagement, innovation and 
internet connectivity.  
Several recent studies examine the TED data set. Kutlina-Dimitrova and Lakatos (2016) analyze the 
determinants of the probability of awarding public procurement contracts directly cross-border using a 
multivariate logit model. Gourdon and Messent (2017) show that a country's membership of the WTO 
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) increases the probability of firms being awarded a 
procurement contract in the EU through the cross-border mode of supply. Herz and Varela-Irimia (2017) 
employ a gravity model to study cross-national border effects in the award of European Single Market 
(ESM) public contracts. 
                                                     
1 The African Investor Survey (AIS) – administered by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the EU TED and PP 
regulation quality data. Section 3 examines the effect of PP quality on level of competition, procurement 
procedure and PP cost-effectiveness. Finally, section 4 concludes.  
2. European Union Public Procurement Regulation and Quality  
Djankov et al. (2017) characterizes quality of public procurement regulation for 142 countries in 2016. 
They assess 3 aspects of PP: bidding process, the content and management of the bidding process and 
the contract, and the payment of suppliers involved in public procurement. Additionally, Djankov et al. 
(2017) calculate the Overall Public Procurement Score (PP Overall) by using the arithmetic mean of 
these scores. They collect data using expert surveys of more than 1,900 PP experts. Djankov et al. (2017) 
describe the questionnaire and the coding of the scores in detail. A higher score indicates that the country 
has higher PP quality. 
In summary, bid preparation score gauges quality of the needs assessment and call for tender process. 
Bid and contract management score considers submission and evaluation of bids. Payment of suppliers 
score measures payment time frames and procedures to request payments.  
The PP quality data set of Djankov et al. (2017) provides information about all 31 EU countries 
represented in the TED data set. Table 1 displays the summary statistics of EU PP quality scores.  
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Public Procurement Regulation Scores 
 Mean Standard Dev. Min. Max 
Bid Preparation 0.72 0.09 0.58 0.9 
Bid and Contract 
Management 
0.74 0.14 0.5 1 
Payment of 
Suppliers 
0.75 0.13 0.5 1 
PP Overall Index 0.73 0.09 0.58 0.9 
Table 2 below displays the pairwise correlations of PP scores of countries represented in the TED data 
set. Similar to the pairwise correlations of 142 economies presented in Djankov et al. (2017), different 
categories of PP quality of EU countries are not strongly correlated. Accordingly, each score contains 
particular information about PP quality. 
Table 2: Pairwise Correlations of Public Procurement Scores of TED Countries 
 Bid Preparation Bid and Contract 
Management 
Payment of 
Suppliers 
PP Overall Index 
Bid Preparation 1    
Bid and Contract 
Management 
0.164 1   
Payment of 
Suppliers 
0.267 0.334 1  
PP Overall Index 0.554 0.772 0.777 1 
 
Figure 1 displays the PP quality scores of individual countries. Slovakia has the highest bid preparation 
score of 0.9 and Iceland and Portugal have the lowest score of 0.58. The scores of bid and contract 
management and payment of suppliers differ dramatically across EU countries. Several countries have 
perfect scores of 1 whereas Iceland has a score of 0.5. Finally, the overall PP index varies significantly 
across EU countries. The variation of PP quality scores across EU countries makes it possible to identify 
the effect of PP regulation quality on level of competition and cost-effectiveness. Table OA.4 in the 
online appendix display the Djankov et al. (2017) PP regulation quality scores.  
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Figure 1: Public Procurement Scores of EU Countries 
  
Bid Preparation Bid and Contract Management 
  
Payment of Suppliers Overall Public Procurement Index 
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The TED data is available online in CSV format for years 2006-2017.2 The EU extracts the data from 
the contract notice and contract award notice standard forms filled in by the authorities.3 The original 
data set contains information about 5,303,219 PP contracts for the European Economic Area, 
Switzerland, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. For each contract, the TED data includes 
variables about estimated and contract price, detailed CPV code4 of the subject of procurement, 
procurement method, types of contracting authorities and detailed names and locations of procuring 
agencies and winning firms. I identify the sector of each contract using the first two digits of the CPV 
code noting that there are 72 major sectors. 
PP regulation scores of Djankov et al. (2017) are based on surveys conducted in 2016. Accordingly, 
I examine 412,491 EU PP contracts conducted in year 2016. Tables OA.1 – OA.3 in the online appendix 
display number of contacts with respect to countries, procurement procedures and contracting authority 
types. 
3. Results  
I analyze the effect of PP regulation quality on three PP outcomes: level of competition, procurement 
procedure and PP cost-effectiveness. 
3.1 Competition 
This section empirically examines the effect of PP regulation quality on level of competition in EU PP. 
I measure the level of competition using the number of bidders participating to the procurement as 
Branzoli and Decarolis (2015). Figure 2 displays the histogram of number of bidders for year 2016.5 
The mean of number of bidders is 12.75 with a maximum of 999.6 
  
                                                     
2 I use the contact award notices csv files. The files are available at https://data.europa.eu/euodp/data/dataset/ted-csv. 
3 The standard forms of the EU are available at "http://simap.ted.europa.eu/web/simap/standard-forms-for-public-
procurement. Public authorities are obliged to publish their tender invitations on TED for all contracts exceeding EU public 
procurement thresholds. However, as emphasized by Kulina-Dimitrova and Lakatos (2016), contract awards below the 
threshold are also reported on TED since authorities are in general not prevented from announcing the tender on TED even 
if the tender’s value is below the threshold. 
4 Common Procurement Vocabulary (CPV) establishes a single classification system for public procurement aimed at 
standardizing the references used by contracting authorities and entities to describe the subject of procurement contracts. 
5 Values larger than 50 (2%) are not displayed for brevity.  
6 44 contracts have 999 bidders.  
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Figure 2: Histogram of Number of Bidders 
 
I estimate the following regression equation using negative binomial model following Li and Perrigre 
(2003). 
𝑁𝑐 = 𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑐
𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘+1
5
𝑘=1 𝑃𝑀𝑐
𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑧+6
9
𝑧=1 𝑃𝐴𝑐
𝑧 + 𝜃𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑐  (1) 
where 𝑁𝑐 is the number of bids submitted for each contract. 𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑐
𝑖  is the public procurement quality; 
𝑃𝑀𝑐
𝑘 is the dummy variable for procurement method k and 𝑃𝐴𝑐
𝑧 denotes the type of public procurement 
authority. Additionally, 𝐹𝐸 is the vector of 71 sector and 30 country fixed effects variables.7 All 
estimations use robust standard errors. First four columns of Table 3 show the estimation results of 
equation 5 with alternative PP quality measures, 𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑐
𝑖 . All quality measures have statistically 
significant positive coefficients. Accordingly, PP regulation promotes the level of competition in EU PP 
markets. Countries with better scores are able to attract more bidders. 
                                                     
7 Djankov et al. (2017) does not have public procurement regulation scores for Liechtenstein and Malta. The TED data set 
contains 311 contracts for Liechtenstein and 2,518 for Malta.  
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Table 3: Effect of Public Procurement Regulation Quality on Competition 
 Negative-Binomial  HB-IV GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Bid Preparation 1.87     6.92    
 (68.19)**     (3.05)**    
Management  2.03     6.98   
  (68.17)**     (6.87)**   
Payment   2.24     8.99  
   (68.17)**     (9.27)**  
PP Overall    2.03     8.44 
    (68.17)**     (4.57)** 
Observations 412,491 412,491 412,491 412,491  412,491 412,491 412,491 412,491 
Procedure Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Authority Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. Robust z-statistics in parentheses.   
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Table 3 also considers the case that the BBP quality scores might be endogenous. There might be 
unobserved factors that affect both number of bidders and quality scores. In that case, the error term of 
the regression equation, 𝜀𝑐, will contain these unobserved factors. The quality scores will be correlated 
with the error term and this endogeneity problem will distort the empirical results. I employ an 
instrumental variable (IV) GMM methodology to consider possible endogeneity of PP quality score 
variables. Lewbel (2012) develops a heteroscedasticity-based (HB) identification approach that 
identifies structural parameters when valid IVs do not exist.8 Lewbel (2012) constructs valid IVs that 
are independent of the error term using the heteroscedasticity structure of the error term.9 I implement 
the HB-IV methodology to assess whether potential endogeneity of PP quality scores affect the empirical 
results of the paper. Columns 5-8 of Table 3 display the HB-IV GMM estimation results of equation 1. 
The results do not change when the empirical methodology factors in potential endogeneity of PP quality 
scores. Countries with higher levels of PP regulation quality attract significantly more bidders and 
achieve higher levels of competition.  
3.2 Procurement Procedure 
In this sub-section, I study whether authorities in countries with higher PP regulation quality use the 
competitive open (first price auction) procedure compared to direct purchase and negotiation. I estimate 
the following logit regression specification:  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑐 = 1|x) = 𝐹(𝑥𝑖𝑟𝑡
, 𝛽)               (2) 
where 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑐 is a dummy variable, that is, 1 if authorities employ the open procedure and 0 otherwise. 
𝐹(𝑥𝑖𝑟𝑡
, 𝛽) is a logit probability function of 𝑥𝑖𝑟𝑡
, 𝛽.  𝑥𝑖𝑟𝑡
,
 and X’ contains the explanatory variables 
described in the previous section. The coefficient of 𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑐
𝑖  gauges the impact of PP regulation quality 
on the probability that authorities use a competitive procedure. Empirical analysis also considers that 
the quality scores may be endogenous. Lewbel (2018) shows that a linear probability model can be 
estimated using heteroscedasticity based instrumental variables (IV) of Lewbel (2012) when the 
dependent variable is binary and an explanatory variable is potentially endogenous. Accordingly, we 
correct for possible endogeneity of the 𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑐
𝑖   variables by implementing the IV GMM methodology of 
Lewbel (2012) to the following linear probability model. 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑐 = 𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑐
𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘+1
5
𝑘=1 𝑃𝑀𝑐
𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑧+6
9
𝑧=1 𝑃𝐴𝑐
𝑧 + 𝜃𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑐           (3) 
Table 4 displays the logit and HB-IV GMM estimation of regression specifications of equations 2 and 
3. The coefficients of all quality scores are significant with a positive coefficient. Accordingly, table 4 
concludes that the likelihood that an authority will implement a competitive open procedure is 
significantly higher when a country has better PP regulation quality.  
                                                     
8 Rigobon and Sack (2003) used a similar identification technique to assess the reaction of monetary policy to the stock 
market. Lewbel (2012) generalizes this identification technique. Accordingly, it can be applied to data sets with different 
structures like the TED data set. The method developed by Lewbel (2012) identifies structural parameters by constructing 
instruments as functions of the model’s data when valid instrumental variables do not exist. This approach provides an 
unbiased and consistent estimate of parameters when the regression model contains endogenous or mismeasured regressors, 
or when the model suffers from the omitted-variable bias. The Monte Carlo results and numerous empirical applications 
presented in Lewbel (2012) show that the estimator works very well compared to the two-stage least squares method and 
to GMM when good instrumental variables are not available. The methodology uses the heteroscedasticity of the errors to 
construct valid IVs and consistent and unbiased parameters of the empirical model can be estimated by employing these 
IVs in an IV-GMM setting. 
9 Baldi et al. (2016) implement the HB-IV methodology of Lewbel (2012) in a linear probability model regression setting. 
They study the effect of project complexity and corruption on selection of procurement procedure in 11,400 public 
procurement contracts in Italy over the period 2007-2012. 
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Table 4: Effect of Public Procurement Regulation Quality on Procurement Procedure 
 Logit  HB-IV GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Bid Preparation 2.84     1.14    
 (31.20)**     (87.85)**    
Management  2.57     1.20   
  (31.20)**     (68.27)**   
Payment   2.84     0.59  
   (31.20)**     (97.53)**  
PP Overall    2.57     0.78 
    (31.20)**     (101.53)** 
Observations 412,491 412,491 412,491 412,491  412,491 412,491 412,491 412,491 
Procedure Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Authority Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. Robust z-statistics in parentheses.  
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3.3 Cost-Effectiveness  
Finally, I examine the impact of the WTO GPA on the cost-effectiveness of government procurement. 
I measure cost-effectiveness by assessing whether procurement price is lower than the authority’s 
estimated cost. Article 5-1 of the 2014/24/EU directive describes estimated cost as: “The calculation of 
the estimated value of a procurement shall be based on the total amount payable, net of VAT, as 
estimated by the contracting authority, including any form of option and any renewals of the contracts 
as explicitly set out in the procurement documents.” 
The estimated cost is available in 170,112 observations for year 2016. Furthermore, I check 
consistencies of the reported contract prices and estimated costs. Following Bajari et al. (2014), I 
calculate the ratio of contract price and estimated cost. Table OA.5 in the online appendix display the 
summary statistics of contract price, estimated cost and the ratio for 2016 and 2006-2017. Then, I 
implement Billor et al.’s (2000) BACON methodology (blocked adaptive computationally efficient 
outlier nominators) to identify the outliers. The BACON method identifies contracts with ratios lower 
than 0.25 and higher than 1.87 as outliers, 11,649 contracts. I remove these observations with unrealistic 
values. Table OA.5 in the online appendix display the summary statistics with and without outliers. On 
average, the ratio is 0.91 indicating that the contract price is 91% of the estimated cost. Conley and 
Decarolis (2016) find that on average the contract price (winning bid) is 13.4 percent lower than the 
estimated cost in simple roadworks contracts in Northern Italy. Similarly, Ishii (2009) shows that the 
ratio of winning bid to estimated cost is between 0.80 and 0.95 in Okinawa Prefecture road construction 
auctions in Japan.  
I follow the description of OECD (2012) to identify cost-ineffective procurements. As stated by 
OECD (2012) “value for money” can be assessed by comparing the procurement price and estimated 
costs. Specifically, procurement prices that are higher than the engineering cost estimates are not cost-
effective. OECD (2012) suggests that public authorities should investigate these procurements. I 
determine the tenders with procurement prices lower than estimated costs (ratio of price and estimate is 
smaller than one). Contract prices are below their estimated costs in 95,278 (60.1%) contracts. I label 
these contracts as cost-effective. 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑐 = 1|x) = 𝐹(𝑥𝑖𝑟𝑡
, 𝛽)         (4) 
where 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑐 is a dummy variable, that is, 1 if contract price is lower than estimated cost and 
0 otherwise. 𝐹(𝑥𝑖𝑟𝑡
, 𝛽) is a logit probability function of 𝑥𝑖𝑟𝑡
, 𝛽. 𝑥𝑖𝑟𝑡
,
 and X’ contain the explanatory 
variables described in section 3.1. Additionally, I estimate the following linear probability model using 
HB-IV GMM to consider potential endogeneity of PP quality scores. 
  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑐  = 𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑐
𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘+1
5
𝑘=1 𝑃𝑀𝑐
𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑧+6
9
𝑧=1 𝑃𝐴𝑐
𝑧 + 𝜃𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑐 (5) 
Table 5 presents the estimation results of the logit and HB-IV GMM linear probability models of 
equations 4 and 5. Both models conclude that PP regulation quality has a significant positive effect on 
the probability that the contract is cost-effective. Countries with better PP regulation quality are more 
likely to have cost-effective contracts with lower procurement prices compared to estimated costs.  
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Table 5: Effect of Public Procurement Regulation Quality on Cost-Effectiveness 
 Logit  HB-IV GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Bid Preparation 0.97     0.69    
 (15.63)**     (40.50)**    
Management  1.06     0.79   
  (15.62)**     (56.32)**   
Payment   1.17     0.71  
   (15.62)**     (61.66)**  
PP Overall    1.06     0.97 
    (15.62)**     (57.28)** 
Observations 158,355 158,355 158,355 158,355  158,355 158,355 158,355 158,355 
Procedure Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Authority Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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3.4 Robustness 
In this sub-section, I study the robustness of the empirical results presented in tables 3 and 5. Almost 
1 % of the contracts have very large number of bidders. To assess the robustness of the results about 
competition, I eliminate contracts with more than 100 bidders and rerun the estimations of section 3.1. 
Additionally, I conduct the empirical analyses using the complete TED data set for years 2006-2017, 
3,507,656 contracts.10 Table OA.6 in the online appendix display the robustness analysis for section 3.1. 
All analysis confirm the robustness of the results of table 3. The coefficients of PP quality scores are 
positive and significant. 
Table OA.7 examines the impact of regulation quality on cost-effectiveness using the complete TED 
data set. After eliminating outliers, I study 1,331,066 contracts that have data about estimated costs and 
contract prices. Both logit and HB-IV GMM estimations validate the results of table 5. Regulation 
quality improves cost-effectiveness of EU PP when empirical analysis considers the complete TED data 
set.  
4. Conclusion 
I empirically analyze the effect of public procurement regulation quality on competition and cost-
effectiveness. I examine 412,491 contracts for 31 European Single Market countries. I find that tenders 
in countries with high public procurement quality have higher levels of competition. Countries with 
good quality scores are more likely to implement competitive procurement procedures. Finally, 
improved regulation quality significantly increases the probability that procurement price is lower than 
estimated costs. The paper provides empirical evidence about favorable effects of proper public 
procurement regulation.  
                                                     
10 I employ year fixed effects for these regressions.  
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Online Appendix: 
Table OA.1 
Number of Contracts by Authority Country 
Country  Number of Contracts 
Austria  3,302 
Belgium  3,552 
Bulgaria  11,530 
Croatia  6,339 
Cyprus  667 
Czech Republic  9,449 
Denmark  4,982 
Estonia  2,572 
Finland  4,521 
France  70,168 
Germany  36,788 
Greece  3,774 
Hungary  6,339 
Iceland  86 
Ireland  3,034 
Italy  12,869 
Latvia  10,506 
Lithuania  9,261 
Luxembourg  655 
Macedonia  1,127 
Malta  417 
Netherlands  9,410 
Norway  3,280 
Poland  95,971 
Portugal  1,207 
Romania  26,112 
Slovakia  2,214 
Slovenia  7,975 
Spain  10,027 
Sweden  11,362 
Switzerland  2,526 
United Kingdom  41,754 
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Table OA.2 
Number of Contracts by Procurement Procedure 
Procedure Type  Number of Contracts 
award without prior publication of a contract notice  10,723 
competitive dialogue  532 
negotiated without a call for competition  9,350 
negotiated with a call for competition  17,578 
Open  358,065 
Restricted  16,675 
Table OA.3 
Number of Contracts by Type of Contracting Authority 
Procedure Type  Number of Contracts 
Ministry or any other national or federal authority  40,769 
Regional or local authority  100,931 
Water, energy, transportation and telecommunication  24,915 
European Union institution  1,876 
Other international institution  6 
Body governed by public law  133,060 
Other  88,240 
National or federal Agency  6,619 
Regional or local agency  8,722 
Not specified  7,785 
Table OA.4: Public Procurement Performance Rankings of EU Countries 
Country Bid Preparation Bid and Contract Management Payment of Suppliers PP Overall Index 
Italy 0.7 1 1 0.9 
Spain 0.68 1 1 0.89 
Denmark 0.88 0.75 1 0.88 
Hungary 0.8 1 0.76 0.85 
Austria 0.78 0.87 0.85 0.83 
Slovakia 0.9 0.83 0.75 0.83 
Estonia 0.7 0.87 0.88 0.82 
Czech R. 0.78 0.83 0.75 0.79 
Romania 0.67 1 0.67 0.78 
Ireland 0.73 0.75 0.85 0.77 
Poland 0.87 0.69 0.75 0.77 
Bulgaria 0.88 0.67 0.75 0.76 
Finland 0.66 0.58 1 0.75 
Slovenia 0.68 0.81 0.75 0.75 
Lithuania 0.7 0.75 0.75 0.73 
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Luxembourg 0.67 0.75 0.75 0.72 
Sweden 0.66 0.75 0.75 0.72 
Latvia 0.68 0.69 0.75 0.71 
Switzerland 0.68 0.67 0.75 0.7 
Netherlands 0.78 0.56 0.75 0.7 
France 0.69 0.92 0.5 0.7 
Croatia 0.7 0.71 0.67 0.69 
Macedonia FYR 0.78 0.58 0.67 0.68 
Norway 0.61 0.75 0.67 0.67 
Germany 0.76 0.56 0.67 0.66 
Cyprus 0.7 0.67 0.59 0.65 
Greece 0.63 0.71 0.58 0.64 
Belgium 0.66 0.58 0.67 0.63 
Portugal 0.58 0.56 0.67 0.6 
Iceland 0.58 0.5 0.67 0.58 
UK 0.66 0.58 0.5 0.58 
Bedri Kamil Onur Tas 
16 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
Table OA.5 
Summary Statistics of Contract Prices and Estimated Costs 
 Without Outliers in Year 2016 
Variable Number of Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Contract Price (Euros) 158,463 1,663,194 4.33e+07 0.01 5.51e+09 
Estimated Cost (Euros) 158,463 1,801,556 4.49e+07 0.01 5.51e+09 
Ratio11 158,463 0.91 0.21 0.25 1.87 
 With Outliers in Year 2016 
Contract Price (Euros) 170,112 1,698,895 4.91e+07 0 1.00e+10 
Estimated Cost (Euros) 170,112 2,496,133 1.36e+08 0.01 4.54e+10 
Ratio 170,112 1,944.83 343,679.8 0 1.16e+08 
 Without Outliers in Years 2006-2017 
Contract Price (Euros) 1,653,255 1.06 e+09 1.34 e+12 0.01 1.73 e+15 
Estimated Cost (Euros) 1,653,255 1.06 e+09 1.34 e+12 0.01 1.73 e+15 
Ratio 1,653,255 0.9 0.22 0.25 1.87 
Table OA.6 
Effect of Public Procurement Regulation Quality on Competition 
Negative-Binomial Regression, Tenders without Outliers 
(Number of Bidders <100, 99% of Procurements) 
 Year 2016  Years 2006-2017 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Bid Preparation 1.82     2.23    
 (78.67)**     (298.85)**    
Management  1.97     2.42   
  (78.64)**     (298.88)**   
Payment   2.18     2.68  
   (78.64)**     (298.88)**  
PP Overall    1.97     2.42 
    (78.64)**     (298.88)** 
                                                     
11 Contract price over estimated cost.  
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accelerated negotiated      -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 
      (30.17)** (30.17)** (30.17)** (30.17)** 
accelerated restricted      -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 
      (33.59)** (33.58)** (33.58)** (33.58)** 
award w. publication 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29  0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
 (30.28)** (30.30)** (30.30)** (30.30)**  (30.38)** (30.43)** (30.43)** (30.43)** 
competitive dialogue -0.53 -0.53 -0.53 -0.53  -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 
 (12.29)** (12.34)** (12.34)** (12.34)**  (35.88)** (35.88)** (35.88)** (35.88)** 
negotiated comp. -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12  -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 
 (14.21)** (14.21)** (14.21)** (14.21)**  (79.11)** (79.16)** (79.16)** (79.16)** 
Neg. without comp. -0.89 -0.89 -0.89 -0.89  -0.89 -0.89 -0.89 -0.89 
 (78.93)** (78.88)** (78.88)** (78.88)**  (255.18)** (255.15)** (255.15)** (255.15)** 
restricted 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16  -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 (20.89)** (20.91)** (20.91)** (20.91)**  (15.44)** (15.40)** (15.40)** (15.40)** 
Central government -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (2.86)** (2.78)** (2.78)** (2.78)**  (15.86)** (15.85)** (15.85)** (15.85)** 
Water, energy, transport 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
 (26.59)** (26.63)** (26.63)** (26.63)**  (91.27)** (91.43)** (91.43)** (91.43)** 
EU institution 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04  -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 
 (1.45) (1.50) (1.50) (1.50)  (10.39)** (10.31)** (10.31)** (10.31)** 
other inter. org. -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27  -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 
 (0.70) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70)  (9.80)** (9.78)** (9.78)** (9.78)** 
Gov. by public law 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11  0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
 (23.05)** (22.99)** (22.99)** (22.99)**  (48.51)** (48.40)** (48.40)** (48.40)** 
Other 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16  0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
 (32.32)** (32.22)** (32.22)** (32.22)**  (53.74)** (53.63)** (53.63)** (53.63)** 
National Agency 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10  0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 
 (8.37)** (8.36)** (8.36)** (8.36)**  (72.92)** (72.88)** (72.88)** (72.88)** 
Local Agency -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (7.83)** (7.83)** (7.83)** (7.83)**  (7.78)** (7.78)** (7.78)** (7.78)** 
Not specified 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
 (1.30) (1.29) (1.29) (1.29)  (25.38)** (25.45)** (25.45)** (25.45)** 
Observations 407,041 407,041 407,041 407,041  3,507,656 3,507,656 3,507,656 3,507,656 
Sectoral Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table OA.7 
Effect of Public Procurement Regulation Quality on Cost-Effectiveness  
Logit and Heteroscedasticity-Based Instrumental Variable GMM  
Years 2006-2017 
 Logit  HB-IV GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Bid Preparation 0.79     0.71    
 (34.10)**     (136.28)**    
Management  0.85     0.73   
  (34.09)**     (137.00)**   
Payment   0.95     0.24  
   (34.09)**     (21.52)**  
PP Overall    0.85     0.84 
    (34.09)**     (58.69)** 
accelerated negotiated -1.13 -1.13 -1.13 -1.13  -0.26 -0.26 -0.25 -0.26 
 (25.34)** (25.34)** (25.34)** (25.34)**  (27.22)** (27.08)** (25.54)** (27.23)** 
accelerated restricted -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10  -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
 (4.04)** (4.03)** (4.03)** (4.03)**  (4.02)** (3.93)** (2.98)** (4.20)** 
award w. publication -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48  -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 
 (29.17)** (29.17)** (29.17)** (29.17)**  (27.08)** (26.93)** (25.09)** (27.36)** 
competitive dialogue -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17  -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 
 (2.53)* (2.53)* (2.53)* (2.53)*  (2.54)* (2.49)* (1.96) (2.62)** 
negotiated comp. -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50  -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 
 (36.40)** (36.37)** (36.37)** (36.37)**  (37.18)** (37.03)** (35.56)** (35.79)** 
Neg. without comp. -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95  -0.21 -0.20 -0.19 -0.21 
 (90.04)** (90.01)** (90.01)** (90.01)**  (92.52)** (91.87)** (83.78)** (91.91)** 
restricted -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08  -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
 (6.11)** (6.10)** (6.10)** (6.10)**  (6.42)** (6.18)** (3.53)** (6.55)** 
Central government -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03  -0.00 -0.00 0.03 -0.01 
 (2.83)** (2.89)** (2.89)** (2.89)**  (2.14)* (0.44) (17.96)** (3.47)** 
Water, energy, transport -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27  -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 
 (26.45)** (26.50)** (26.50)** (26.50)**  (25.57)** (24.49)** (11.32)** (25.20)** 
EU institution -0.52 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50  -0.11 -0.10 -0.08 -0.03 
 (15.64)** (15.11)** (15.11)** (15.11)**  (15.96)** (15.15)** (12.19)** (4.15)** 
other inter. org. -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20  -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 
 (1.24) (1.24) (1.24) (1.24)  (1.15) (1.09) (0.49) (1.02) 
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Gov. by public law -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15  -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 
 (21.38)** (21.38)** (21.38)** (21.38)**  (19.58)** (17.42)** (6.86)** (18.01)** 
Other -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10  -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 
 (14.69)** (14.70)** (14.70)** (14.70)**  (13.03)** (11.19)** (9.18)** (12.54)** 
National Agency -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22  -0.04 -0.03 -0.00 -0.04 
 (12.00)** (12.01)** (12.01)** (12.01)**  (10.93)** (10.10)** (0.68) (11.59)** 
Local Agency 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03  0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 
 (2.28)* (2.27)* (2.27)* (2.27)*  (1.89) (2.77)** (12.23)** (1.05) 
Not specified -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20  -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 
 (8.88)** (8.88)** (8.88)** (8.88)**  (8.43)** (8.10)** (4.32)** (7.66)** 
Observations 1,331,066 1,331,066 1,331,066 1,331,066  1,331,066 1,331,066 1,331,066 1,331,066 
Sectoral Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01  
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